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North Korea - Cuba: North Korea has received its first diplomatic recognition outside the bloc with the 29 August agreement to exchange ambassadors with Cuba "as soon as possible." Cuba has little to gain economically from North Korea, but establishment of relations at this time is consistent with the increasingly close ties between Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc and probably foreshadows establishment of relations between Cuba and Communist China. Pyongyang will probably publicize this development to show that Western opposition to the North Korean regime need not be a barrier to recognition. [REDACTED] (Page 3)

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Bloc-UN: There are increasing signs that Khrushchev and satellite leaders will attend the opening of the forthcoming UN General Assembly session on 20 September. Khrushchev may use his short visit to Finland as the occasion to appeal to world leaders to attend the General Assembly discussion, announce his intention to attend the meeting, and hint at some new initiative on disarmament. [REDACTED]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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DAILY BRIEF

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III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.

NOTE: There have been no new developments with respect to West Berlin which would require a change in the conclusions of the special Watch Committee meeting of 30 August. *no*

- C. The following developments are susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which could jeopardize the security of the US in the immediate future:

The new Souvanna Phouma cabinet, comprising supporters of both General Phoumi and Souvanna, appears to be acceptable to Lao officials other than Kong Le. The new Laotian Government will probably adopt neutralist policies which would afford opportunities for increased Communist presence in Laos.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Kong Le's political isolation may cause him to seek an alliance with the Pathet Lao and thus pose a political and military threat to the stability of the country.

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LATE ITEMS

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*Situation in Laos as of 0230 EDT: In a sudden about face Captain Kong Le is reported to have dropped his opposition to the compromise government put together in Luang Prabang by premier-designate Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi. If true, this would appear to remove the last major stumbling block to the restoration of constitutional order in Laos. An atmosphere of distrust prevails however. After Kong Le's initial rejection of the government on 31 August on the grounds that Phoumi and other members of the ousted Somsanith government would "try to seize power again and will resume civil war," Phoumi returned to his base at Savannakhet but agreed to come back to Luang Prabang on 1 September if Souvanna Phouma won Kong Le's cooperation.

Souvanna, who flew to Vientiane on 31 August immediately after the national assembly voted confidence in his government, has issued an invitation over Vientiane radio for the Communist Pathet Lao to send representatives to Vientiane where he believed "outstanding problems can be settled within a few days." Presumably Souvanna made this gesture to convince Kong Le that the aims of his coup would be incorporated into the policies of the new government. He may also have made other concessions to secure Kong's cooperation which could ultimately prove unacceptable to Phoumi and other anti-Communists in the new government.

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*Iran: Nationalist and anti-government elements in Tehran, apparently encouraged by the Shah's 27 August statement criticizing irregularities in the recent parliamentary elections, reportedly have scheduled a major demonstration in the capital on

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[1 September. Allahyar Saleh, leader of the Iran Party and former associate of ex-Premier Mossadeq who has aroused considerable popular enthusiasm with his criticism of the elections, may come to Tehran from the provincial city of Kashan in conjunction with the demonstration. The government is probably aware of the nationalists' plans and may initiate action to prevent the demonstration. Should this not deter the nationalists, serious clashes with the security forces could occur.]

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North Korea and Cuba to Establish Diplomatic Relations

North Korea has received its first diplomatic recognition outside the bloc with the 29 August agreement to exchange ambassadors with Cuba "as soon as possible." The announcement was made in a joint declaration issued in Havana after Cuba's acting Foreign Minister Cepero Bonilla and North Korean Finance Minister Han Sang-tu had signed a cultural exchange agreement.

Before this agreement with Havana, Pyongyang had been conspicuously unsuccessful in its efforts to gain recognition from non-Communist countries, although it did manage to make a few trade and cultural contacts. Now it will make every effort to flaunt its first nonbloc embassy in efforts to convince neutral nations they too can ignore Western opposition and accept the Pyongyang regime as a member of the international community.

Havana's action is consistent with the increasingly close ties being developed between Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc and may foreshadow recognition of Peiping, with which Cuba concluded a trade pact in July. Communist China has displayed particular sympathy for the Cuban revolution, and Chou En-lai on 15 August pledged the Cuban people "every possible aid, with no strings attached," in their anti-US "struggle."

Fidel Castro, in his recent public attacks on the United States, has repeatedly declared Cuba's intention "to be the friend of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples' Republic because they have proved to be our friends." On 30 August, he condemned "US intervention everywhere in the world--in Korea, Taiwan, Indochina, and everywhere else. . . defending the Chiang Kai-shek puppet."

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